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# INFORMATION REPORT

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**SUBJECT** Communist Activities During November 1948

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**SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO. 2**

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The following report of the activities of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) for the month of November 1948 includes the activities of the last five days of October, from the time of the Odria revolution.

### General Comment

1. The Decree-Law of 1 November 1948 outlawing the PCP drove the Party underground and brought about a state of temporary disorganization that continued during most of the month. The Party's activity was limited to defensive measures. It was only at the very end of November that the PCP pulled itself together sufficiently to issue its first clandestine pronouncement, a leaflet on the Divisas (exchange) dispute. Taking stock at the end of the month, however, Party leaders found that they had not been persecuted, and they believed that even if organized Party activity were impossible, individual leaders might well be able to work themselves into positions of control in the labor field, and continue the Party's work in that manner for the time being.
2. Meanwhile, the outlawing of the APRA and the PCP left the labor field open to the only two remaining organized groups of any significance. These were the dissident Communist followers of Juan P. Luna and the Frente de Unidad e Independencia Sindical (FUIS). Both of these groups are controlled by ex-Communists, and it should be emphasized that although breaking at various times and for various reasons with the orthodox PCP, these individuals have broken away for reasons of personal rivalry or jealousy arising from immediate tactical disputes. The schisms were not caused by long term strategic disagreement, and these leaders undoubtedly remain what might be described as "good Marxists" even if no longer bearing the Communist Party name.
3. In order to build popular labor support, the Odría Military Junta is expected to rely to a large extent on these groups, and it will remain to be seen which of them will predominate and to what extent they may be able to dictate terms. In preliminary skirmishes in that struggle, Luna and the FUIS joined forces on 18 November to put on the only substantial labor display of the month in support of Odría, to the mutual advantage of both.

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25X1A2g

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

4. The FUIS, a numerically small but articulate group, has been brought back into prominence through prior collaboration with Odría when he was Minister of Government. This small group, used and reportedly financed by the Alianza Nacional, appeared to be dropping out of sight with the breakup of the Alianza and the disappearance of Vanguardia, one of its principal propaganda media. It has been restored to a position of importance with the accession of Odría, and it will be treated separately.

A. The Orthodox Communist Party of Peru

General

5. During the last days of October, the Party succeeded in printing a final edition of Labor, the Party news organ, before the lease on the press expired. The issue is dated 1 November, the date of the Decree making the Party illegal. The paper was to have appeared on the newsstands that evening, but all copies were confiscated at the press by the government and none appeared for sale.
6. This issue contained the Party's last legal statement on the Odría government and its program. The statement was in the form of a communique signed by the Central Secretariat of the PCP and it was drawn up on 31 October. It expressed the Party's opposition to the Odría regime and again indicated the Party's approval of the Bustamante program, for even if it could not be completely fulfilled, it at least did not exhibit the serious and dangerous defects of Odría's program. Basing its attack on the Odría government on the General's statement that he would apply the Bogota anti-Communist agreement and eliminate all germs of Communism, the communique asks how this government or any other can guarantee democratic constitutionalism "under the Hitler and Marshall banner of anti-Communism".
7. Particularly disconcerting to the Party during the period immediately following the Odría coup were the editorial in La Prensa for 27 October and the articles in the same paper for 31 October and 1 November which violently attacked the PCP. Party leaders were particularly incensed at these articles because the author, Sergio Velez Raygada, was only recently expelled from the PCP\* and his information on Communism would be considered authoritative. Party leaders also believed that Velez Raygada wrote the La Prensa editorial of 4 November, which "unmasked" the Party's pretense of being a national party and branded it as being directly under the direction of Moscow.
8. Protests continued to be received by Party leaders over the Manifesto of 28 October which subsequently became known among del Prado's critics as "the death warrant of the Party". Del Prado and Macedo Mendoza, the National Secretaries of Organization and Propaganda, were blamed for their lack of political vision in publishing the Manifesto and they were censured for departing from the Party line as laid down at the III National Congress, which provided nowhere for support of Bustamante, but called for a continued fight against APRA and Yankee imperialism. One bitter protest came from Vicente Mendoza Diaz in Puno, who reminded Party leaders in Lima that although he had been elected twice as deputy from Puno, his election has been annulled twice by the Bustamante government. He asked how the Party could defend a government which had consistently broken its promises to the Communists, in spite of the support they had given it in the 1945 elections.
9. At a meeting of Party leaders held on 3 November at Negelros 568, notice was received that Odría had issued orders to imprison all officers of the PCP, who were to be held until the authors of the Manifesto had been identified. None of the leaders were arrested in Lima, and there is doubt now whether such orders had ever been issued.
10. The Party began to plan its future actions as soon as the Decree-Law of 1 November was promulgated. They felt that the Odría government could only last a few months,

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25X1A2g

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-3-

and that even if individual Party members were apprehended and jailed, it would only be for a relatively short period. The Party future was believed to lie in the direction of controlling labor, and it was felt that it would be necessary to cooperate with Aprista elements. This cooperation with the APRA was to be a project for the future, and present plans were to avoid all Aprista contacts. The Party leaders decided to await further announcements concerning Odría's promised Congreso Obrero (Workers' Congress) to assess their chances of infiltrating its membership and influencing its decisions.

11. Meanwhile the days following 1 November were ones of difficulty and confusion for the PCP, and certain Party leaders planned to leave Lima to go south, to such areas as Arequipa, Cuzco or Puno, to ride out the storm in those centers of Communist strength, which might afford them better protection and easier living conditions than Lima. All Party activities, of course, following the Decree-Law of 1 November, were clandestine in character, and meetings were of necessity small and communication and even movement difficult, with instructions being carried always by word of mouth. In spite of these difficulties, members of the Central Committee who remained in Lima and representatives of the Lima Departmental Committee still maintained contact and formally agreed on instructions to "lie low" until the situation should be clarified.
12. Jorge del Prado, in spite of his responsibility for the 28 October Manifesto, remained the Party's outstanding leader during those days, ably assisted by his brother Julio del Prado as leg-man. He established himself as the Party's real leader and moving spirit in that time of Party stress.
13. By 9 November, Party security measures were fairly well organized, and all Party leaders had been assigned numbers and, in addition, a pseudonym to be used in conjunction with all Party activities. The members of the Central Committee all took the names of the Inca Emperors as their "noms de guerre" and other famous names from the period of the Conquest were used by other Party leaders. All written communications and receipts for funds were to be couched in terms of correspondence regarding office equipment. Thus a receipt for funds, where indispensable, would appear as a receipt for typewriter repairs. Because of telephone censorship both of local and long distance calls, use of the telephone for Party matters has been absolutely prohibited to all members. Calls of any kind to the residences of well-known Party members and to the bookstore have been strictly forbidden.
14. The regular collection of Party dues was reportedly arranged on 9 November, and they were turned over to the National Secretary of Economy at a different series of prearranged meeting places on a regular weekly basis. Collections within the Ministries were made by fellow employees under the cover of ordinary business contacts during regular business hours. All possible precautions were ordered and instituted to keep these funds coming and to protect their source, nature, and ultimate destination. As of 19 November, it was reported that, unlike the case of APRA, there had been no purge of Party members from jobs within the government offices and public administration. Most of these individuals, the majority of whom appear to be in the Ministry of Education still held their jobs at the end of the month.
15. As previously reported,\* once the success of the Arequipa revolt appeared assured, steps were immediately taken to remove all Party files and records from PCP headquarters, Colmena 669. The meeting held there 29 October was the last to be held on those premises. These provisions were opportune, for Colmena 669 was reportedly raided by the government the evening of 31 October and formally closed with a 24-hour police guard the following day. The government also planned to expropriate the headquarters of the Communist-controlled Taxi-drivers' Union in Cuzco, the largest Communist meeting place in that city.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-4-

16. Party files and records were broken up further on 9 November and all records of foreign contacts were taken to Huancayo by Eliseo Garcia, and secreted in that city. Membership records and accounts were further scattered and hidden in the vicinity of Chosica and in Santa Clara, on the Chosica road. Other such records were split up and hidden in the houses of little-known Party members in the Huancayo area.
17. One note of possible arrangement for the Party was the appointment of Jorge Hernandez Stoll as an advisor to the Junta. However, in spite of this, the return of Barrios, and the abandonment of further action against the Koseleffs, Party opinion through November was reported to remain opposed to the Junta on all points. Party leaders freely expressed the opinion that the Odría Military Junta cannot last out the year. A tentative first step toward concerted positive action in opposition was taken in the form of the whispering campaign to discredit the Junta.
18. PCP opposition to the Junta was solidified when the Party was notified that all efforts to obtain payment of the Communist Deputies' salaries for October had failed and that Odría himself had stated that "as far as he was concerned, the Communist Deputies were in exactly the same position as the Aprista Deputies, and they could expect nothing from his government." In view of this decision, the Communist Deputies planned to leave Lima, where, they said, they were too well known to accomplish anything. Juan Barrio also returned to Andahuaylas on 19 November, with instructions to keep Party members in the Department of Apurímac informed of the situation in Lima.
19. Meanwhile Party leaders continued to meet more or less regularly in Lima, choosing a different place each time, utilizing particularly the houses of little-known individual cell leaders. At one of these meetings held 12 November it was reported that word had been received from Eliseo Garcia in Huancayo that the comrades in that area were "on guard", awaiting orders from Lima, and that he himself might remain there for some time, for he saw little to be served by his return to Lima.
20. It was also reported at the same meeting that communications had been received from the south, in which local leaders in the areas of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa requested Lima approval to act independently on their own account without Lima clearance in view of the difficulties of the situation. However, they indicated they would attempt to keep in touch and inform Lima and each other ahead of time as to local plans and intentions.
21. The meeting was closed by a report from Jorge del Prado concerning Genaro Carnero Checa, the editor of the weekly magazine 1948. Del Prado stated that Carnero Checa had visited him at home and told him that he had been summoned by Odría and given a warning, because the 1 November issue of 1948 had carried the Communist Manifesto of 28 October. Carnero Checa said Odría told him that the Manifesto was the cause of his having declared the PCP illegal. Both APRA and the PCP, Odría reportedly stated, were parties whose organization was clearly international and for that reason they had been banned from the political life of Peru. It was to be hoped, said Odría, that 1948 would not make such statements again or he would be obliged to take stronger measures.
22. Del Prado stated to the meeting that he had grave doubts concerning Carnero Checa's visit to the Palace and he believed that the real purpose of the visit may have been to obtain information from Carnero on the PCP and its strength, organization and leaders. It was believed that Odría indeed threatened to take stronger measures against 1948 unless such information were forthcoming. Del Prado suggested that Carnero's visit to him was merely to ingratiate himself with the Party as their defender and propagandist. He warned Party leaders to be on their

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-5-

guard against Carnero whose magazine was still, he pointed out, financed by representatives of the Alianza Nacional. As a result of del Prado's report, Juan Francisco Castillo, one of the editors of 1948 and a member of the PCP, was asked to report regularly to the Party on Carnero Checa\*\*\*\* and his activities.

23. An emergency meeting of Party leaders was called two days later on 14 November to review the PCP's financial situation. In view of the lack of funds it was decided to rent or sell the premises of the Party bookstore at Calle Negreiros 568 and the small back-room apartment they have at the same address, where Party files and records have been secreted and small clandestine meetings held. The proceeds will be handled by Sergio Caller, National Secretary of Economy, and deposited in a Lima bank, in the name of two Party members whose identity will be kept secret from all except the Secretariat General for security purposes in order to assure the safekeeping of these last funds.
24. No further meetings were reported until a week later when a truncated "Central Committee" meeting was held on 21 November to consider certain general matters of policy. Although it was decided to maintain their decision to refrain from all leaflet campaigns or other propaganda activity for the moment, two problems were discussed with a view toward possible action in the future.
25. The first of these was the dispute being waged among factions within the government and between La Prensa and El Comercio over the foreign exchange control policy. The meeting was well pleased with this evidence of dissension within the government. They pointed out that by declaring APRA and the PCP illegal, Odría has alienated large elements of popular support. Internal dissension among the Rightists would be to the advantage of the Communists for it would demonstrate the Conservatives incapacity to govern. They believed the "divisas" (exchange) dispute could ultimately be used to the advantage of the Communists, and it subsequently formed the basis of the first Party statement to be issued since being declared illegal.
26. Party leaders decided to await further clarification of the Junta's labor policy and a further definition of the Congreso Obrero before taking a stand. Party circles in the Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa areas have suggested that the government's labor congress be boycotted completely at PCP orders and an independent southern labor congress under PCP control be held instead in Arequipa. They believed that such a move might impress the Odría Junta with the power still wielded by the PCP among labor.
27. News of the arrest in Cuzco of several Party leaders and members of the Cuzco Departmental Committee as well as Party members of less importance caused great alarm in Lima. Orders were issued to tighten all security precautions until the matter was investigated and its significance determined. It subsequently appeared that the excuse for the arrests was an attempted Party meeting in honor of the Anniversary of the Soviet Union on 7 November, although further information on the arrests was not obtained until the very end of the month. Among those arrested were:

Juan Jacinto Paiva	- Communist Deputy from La Convención.
Julio Cesar Pastor	- Secretary General of the Federacion de Trabajadores del Cuzco.
Mariano Muñiz	- Director of the Cuzco Communist news organ <u>Jornada</u> and Departmental leader.
Emiliano Huamantla	- Secretary of the "Huascar" Textile Union and a member of the Central Committee of the PCP.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-6-

Victor Angeles V. - Leader of the Communist-controlled Taxi Drivers' Union and editor of its newspaper El Volante.

Luis Lovon - Textile labor leader.

Efrain Morote - Employee.

Sebastian Pinta - Communist leader among the local Indian population.

Arturo Iturbe - Employee.

Isidoro Leiva - Typesetter, leader of the Sindicato Grafico.

Enrique Iberico - Shopkeeper.

Florencio Aragón - Laborer.

Victor Mariano Salas - Railway worker.

Cesar Granados - Laborer.

Rosaria Bocangel - Head of the Communist-front Accion Femenina in Cuzco. Not herself a Party militant, she is the sister of one of the leading female Party members in Cuzco, Estela Bocangel.

28. Word was also received that Vicente Mendoza Diaz had been arrested in Puno at the same time, but shortly afterward released. Of the above group, Luis Lovon, accused of Communist agitation in the "Huascar" Textile Mill in Cuzco by the Lomellinis was brought to Lima on 28 November.
29. As the Party proceeded to reestablish its communications throughout Peru, the National Secretary of Economy, Sergio Caller, used these channels to contact Party members, in addition to friends and sympathizers in an appeal for further contributions toward Party friends. He emphasized the Party's serious financial difficulties since it no longer received its share of the Deputies' salaries. Toward the end of the month, however, he was still only able to report meagre results. Particularly disappointing were the reactions of friends and sympathizers, he said, many of whom now found a hundred excuses why they could not continue their contributions to Party funds, evidently from fear, which he hoped was only momentary.
30. An important meeting was held the last week in November between Senator Jose Antonio Encinas representing friends and advisors of the PCP, and Jorge del Prado, representing the Party leadership. Meeting at Encinas' house in Lima, the Senator informed del Prado that a group of Senators and Deputies including himself, Deputy Carlos Gonzalez Loli, Senator Luis Galvan, Senator Rafael Aguilar, Senator Francisco Tamayo and ex-Senator J. Uriel Garcia (the last two now in Cuzco), all friends and advisors of the PCP, had determined to approach Odría on the problem of the Communist Deputies. They were intending to urge the Junta to follow the example of Chile where even though the PCCh was outlawed, the Chilean Communist Senators and Deputies, freely elected at free elections, continued to hold their Congressional seats and were only removed by the Congress itself when further proof against them was submitted to that body.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-7-

31. Encinas also pointed out that the Decree-Law declaring the PCP illegal only applied specifically to the Communist Party of Peru, and made no mention of the Partido Vanguardia Socialista, the name under which the Communist Party is registered with the National Electoral Jury. If elections were held in the future, said Encinas, he saw no reason why the name of the Socialist Vanguard Party might not be used freely by them.
32. Word of the del Prado-Encinas conference was reportedly spread throughout the Party and they were encouraged by these efforts on their behalf by friends and sympathizers among the independent Senators and Deputies.
33. By the last days of November the PCP had pulled itself together to the point where it felt capable of taking positive offensive action once more. Utilizing the schism that existed within the Junta on the question of foreign exchange control, they mimeographed and distributed a six-page leaflet which, analyzing the postwar economic crisis according to the "Scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism", concludes that the struggle for exchange controls is nothing more than the struggle against imperialism.
34. From the point of view of general overall morale, with the end of November, fear of prosecution among the PCP had begun to wear off. Although there were scares during the month, such as the Cuzco arrests, for example, on the whole it was not fearful of future prosecution. There were a few encouraging items and some Party leaders even professed to be optimistic.

Correspondence and Contacts with Foreign Communists

35. Cuba. A communication from Cuba announcing plans for a projected Youth Congress has been previously reported. New addresses were reported to have been in preparation at that time for future communications.
36. Peru. Victor Zavala and Juan Trelles, Peruvian Labor delegates to the International Labor Organization Petroleum Conference at Geneva, were received at the Presidential Palace by General Odria on 7 November and left by air that same day for Geneva.
37. Venezuela. At the end of the month Jorge del Prado received a communication from Venezuela which, according to del Prado, was apparently transmitted by open mail from Gustavo Machado. The letter was addressed to del Prado at Colmena 699, and delivered to him by Juan Oliva, a member of the PCP who keeps a small tailor shop directly across the street from former Party headquarters. Oliva has been charged with accepting and delivering any mail, etc., that might come directed to the old address. The communication from Machado has reportedly aroused great interest among Party leaders here. According to their information, although the Venezuela Military Coup exhibits similarities with that of Odria in Peru, the Communist Party has not been outlawed in Venezuela. They hope that Machado's experience may afford them guidance in dealing with matters in Peru. There is a debate among Party leaders as to whether they may denounce the Venezuelan Revolution as the work of the imperialists who were alarmed at the growing strength of Communism among the Venezuelan oil workers. They have attempted to communicate with Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela on this point for further information and direction.
38. Mexico. Copies of the Boletín de Información de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S. continued to arrive during November. Fifty copies of No. 36(238), 100 copies of No. 38(240), and 150 copies of No. 39(241) were received during the month.
39. Miscellaneous. Roberto Morena passed through Lima, 13-16 November. Corsino Duran arrived from Santiago, with Communist propaganda material. Mirtha Silva,

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-8-

who had been suspected without confirmation of being a possible Communist courier, arrived in Lima 26 November 1948 from Santiago to fulfill a night-club engagement. No contacts between her and the PCP were reported during November.

B. Juan P. Luna and his Dissident Group

40. The reaction of the Luna group to the Decree-Law of 1 November has been described as one of smug self-satisfaction. Claiming that they foresaw the illegalization of the PCP, they boasted that they broke with it on purpose and in consequence were now in the clear. There is very little evidence in the contemporary record, however, to support any such claim.
41. They renewed their attacks on del Prado, pointing out that his vaunted leadership had led the Party straight into illegality. They stated that his strong-willed attitude of acting as he pleased without consulting the rank and file had done his followers and the Communist cause more harm than was ever done by APRA or any of its other enemies.
42. Meanwhile the dissidents, untouched by the 1 November Decree-Law, talked in terms of forming a Party similar to Lombardo Toledano's Partido Popular in Mexico, that is, a "Communist" Party which would not be known as such. Organizational plans toward that end were reported to be proceeding among the pro-Luna membership of the chauffeurs, the civil construction workers, and the port and maritime workers, where Luna's main labor strength lies.
43. Luna identified the Congreso Obrero as the work of Odria's FUIS advisors. He stated that the FUIS was numerically insignificant in comparison with the group controlled by him. He indicated that he believed that they could easily be infiltrated and controlled in spite of the facilities that would undoubtedly be afforded them by the Junta in view of past cooperation between Odria and FUIS leaders.
44. Luna stated early in the month that he and Orbegoso were awaiting development with few doubts as to their ability to dominate any labor Congress that might ultimately materialize. He indicated his belief that in attempting to found a labor organization to support the government, Odria would soon find Luna in control.
45. One of the most important labor groups to pay their respects to Odria during the month were a delegation from another Luna-controlled union, namely, the Sindicato de Estibadores del Cabotaje Mayor del Callao (Stevedores Union) who were received by the President of the Military Junta on 8 November.
46. That delegation was made up of the following:

Julio Tizon Olaya	- Secretary General
Luis Morcillo Zapata	- Sub-Secretary
Miguel Mori Castillo	- Secretary for Organization
Pedro Curay Seminario	- Secretary of Defense
Rafael Eguez Catalino	- Interior Secretary
Alejandro Cubillas Gomez	- Press and Propaganda Secretary
Alejandro Chavez Picon	- Secretary of Economy
Pedro Espinoza Rosell	- Secretary of Discipline
Carlos E. Ruiz Perez	- Secretary of Control and Statistics
Cesar Briceno	- Secretary of Social Aid
Juan Mayta Patino	- Secretary of Sports and Culture

Four members of the above delegation, including the Secretary-General, are "Luna-Communists": Tizon, Morcillo, Curay and Cubillas. Through them the Sindicato is controlled by Alipio Orbegoso, of whom Tizon is a close collaborator.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

47. A second Luma-controlled group to appear at the Palace during the month was the Sindicato de Pasteleros Estrella del Peru, who were received by the Presidential Secretary and promised their support to Odría on 16 November.

Frente de Unidad e Independencia Sindical

48. With the accession to power of General Odría, the FUIS, with which Odría had cooperated when he was Minister of Government, was brought back into prominence. Juan Cerpa Valdivia catapulted into a position of importance within the FUIS. Cerpa is Odría's idea-man on the labor union level, and one of those responsible for the organization of the projected Congreso Obrero.
49. Cerpa is reported to have been in close contact with Odría since the first days of the Junta, and within his own group to have replaced Jose Benites with Lino Larrea, a Cerpa man, while he himself holds the position of Secretary of Organization of the FUIS.
50. The FUIS was the first labor organization to declare its support of the new regime in a declaration signed by Larrea and published 2 November. Shortly thereafter, on 8 November, a delegation led by Larrea paid its respects to the President in person, with the usual laudatory speeches and declarations of support for Odría's proposed Congreso Obrero Nacional.
51. In spite of past hostility between the FUIS and the PCP, Cerpa has stated that he has advised the Junta not to persecute Communist and pro-Communist labor, at least for the time being. Should the government do so, it is Cerpa's argument that it would inevitably throw the PCP and the APRA into each other's arms and thereby require the surveillance, imprisonment and deportation of labor leaders. This would produce a bad impression among the laboring classes who would interpret these acts not politically but as directed at them. The government would gain an anti-labor reputation which it does not wish to acquire at the moment. Cerpa believes that his advice is being followed on this point. Whether his desire to bring this point to the attention of Communist Party leaders can be interpreted as an overture toward the PCP remains to be seen.
52. By way of positive steps, when Cerpa offered to show the Junta what the FUIS and its affiliates could do, having no control of any substantial numbers himself, he went to Luma as the only labor leader not now outlawed commanding a substantial following. He proposed to Luma that the latter assist Cerpa in putting on a labor demonstration at the Palace with the aid of the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores en Autobuses (Bus Workers Union - SUTA), of which Luma is Secretary of Organization. In return, Cerpa promised to use his influence at the Palace to adjust the SUTA's labor complaint, still pending from the prior regime, in a manner satisfactory to Luma.
53. Luma agreed, and the manifestation at the Palace on 18 November was the result, when some two thousand individuals staged the only substantial demonstration of labor support for the Military Junta that had taken place since the installation of the new government. Luma and Orbegoso did their work well, and called out many "ringers" from the port and dock workers and the civil construction workers as well as legitimate members of the SUTA. Francisco Marquez, a Luma-Communist, Secretary General of the SUTA, made the only speech on behalf of the group, and the manifestation was reported to have been entirely satisfactory to Cerpa, whose prestige and position with the Junta were greatly increased as a result.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-10-

54. Thus Cerpa obtained his first triumph and apparently kept his promise, for there was every indication at the end of the month that the SUTA's pending labor complaint would be satisfactorily settled within a matter of days, thereby enhancing Luna's prestige as well.

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\*\* ~~SECRET~~ Comment. Genaro Carnero Checa, was expelled from the PCP during his exile in Mexico. On his return to Peru in 1946, he applied for readmission to the Party, but was never readmitted. Jorge del Prado was reported to be one of the strongest opponents of Carnero Checa's formal readmission to full Party membership.)

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